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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the case 
This is a straightforward case. It involves an Idaho resident's personal income tax 
liability. This is a tax case, yes, but the issues involve relatively uncomplicated non-tax matters. 
The Idaho resident in question is the Appellant, Linda Dunn. This case revolves around 
her community property interest in the wages earned by her husband, Barry Dunn. 
Although married, Linda and Barry Dunn lived apart during the years in question. Barry 
Dunn was never an Idaho resident during the years at issue, and he earned his wages out-of-state. 
The taxable income in question in this case was earned in two states, Texas and Washington. 
Both of these states are governed by community property laws. 
As a point of emphasis, we note that this case is not about taxing Barry Dunn or his 
income. Rather, this case is about Linda Dunn, and her requirement to report her community 
property interest in the income her husband made. Under Idaho law, Linda Dunn is required to 
pay tax on the income she received from her one-half interest in her husband's wages. 
The Appellant's Brief argues two main points that Linda Dunn should not have to report 
any taxable interest in her husband's income: 
First, the Appellant's Brief argues that it is unconstitutional to tax Linda Dunn based on 
her husband's out-of-state earnings. But there is no serious issue here, because primary legal 
authority shows that there are no constitutional problems with Idaho's taxation of Linda Dunn's 
community property income. The controlling law clearly requires Linda Dunn to report and pay 
tax on the community income, even if the source of the income comes from out-of-state. 
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Second, in the alternative, the Appellant's Brief asserts that the wages are not actually 
community property under Texas law. But a quick review of Texas law leads to the conclusion 
that Barry Dunn's wages are actually community property. 
After reflection, it becomes clear that the legal arguments in Appellant's Brief all seem to 
rest on one premise: that Idaho is illegally attempting to tax Barry Dunn himself, a non-resident. 
But that premise is flatly incorrect; Idaho is not taxing Barry Dunn or his portion of community 
income, but is taxing the interest that Linda Dunn alone has in her community income. The 
distinction is clear: Idaho is attributing income Barry Dunn earned to Linda Dunn. Idaho is not 
taxing Barry Dunn or his income. Since Idaho is not taxing Barry Dunn's portion of the 
community income, then the legal arguments in Appellant's Brief fail. 
In the end, as the District Court held, Linda Dunn had a vested one-half interest in the 
wages earned by Barry Dunn in Texas and Washington during the years in question. Linda 
Dunn is an Idaho resident, and is subject to taxation in Idaho on her community income. 
The District Court should be affirmed. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
The Idaho State Tax Commission (Commission) issued a deficiency against Linda 
Dunn's one-half community property interest in Barry Dunn's wages for the taxable years. R., p. 
115. The Decision entered by the Commission was only addressed to Linda Dunn and was 
concerned only with income attributed to her. R., p. 115. 
Linda Dunn filed an appeal to the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals, and the Board affirmed 
the Commission's Decision. R., pp. 17-25. Linda Dunn then filed an appeal of the Board's 
Decision to the District Court. R., pp. 9-25. The District Court held a trial de nova, on an agreed 
record, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 63-3812(c). The District Court, too, affirmed the 




Commission's Decision. R., pp. 114-128. Linda Dunn then filed this appeal with the Idaho 
Supreme Court. R., pp. 129-133. 
Because this case so completely revolves around whether the District Court's conclusions 
were legally correct, for ease of reference here, the Commission includes the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision being appealed in this case. It is appended to this brief as an addendum. 
(The Decision is denominated in the Addendum as Document #1: Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Plaintiffs Petition for Judicial Review (June 8, 2016), R., pp. 114-128.) 
III. Statement of Facts 
While the Commission substantially agrees with the facts set out in the Appellant's Brief, 
App. Brief, pp. 2-3, the Commission notes that the Appellant's Brief included many more facts 
than are necessary for the resolution of this case. A more concise statement of the facts is as 
follows: 
The parties agreed below that there were no factual disputes, and that the only issue on 
appeal to the District Court was whether Linda Dunn is liable for income tax on her one-half 
community property interest in the wages her husband earned out-of-state. See Joint Stipulation 
of Facts (Stipulation) at <JI 4. R., pp. 38-52. 
In this case, Barry and Linda Dunn were married for all the years at issue (2000-2001, 
2003-2005, and 2007-2010) (taxable years). R., p. 39, 115. But the couple lived apart during the 
taxable years. See R., pp. 39-40, 115. For his part, Barry Dunn generally lived and had his place 
of domicile in those states in which he was working. See R., pp. 39-40, 115. Specifically, Barry 
Dunn was domiciled in Washington in 2000-2001, and was domiciled in Texas during 2003-
2010. R., pp. 39-40, 115. For her part, Linda Dunn was a resident and domiciled in Idaho for all 
the taxable years. R., pp. 39, 115. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL1 
The issues to be decided by this Court are: 
1. Whether the District Court correctly determined that an Idaho resident's interest 
in her spouse's community property wages, earned out-of-state, is subject to income taxation; 
and 
2. Whether the District Court correctly concluded that there are no constitutional 
violations here. 
1 The Appellant's Brief identifies eleven ( 11) different issues to be decided in this appeal. The 
Commission believes that all the issues in the case can be fairly decided within the framework of its stated 
issues here. 










I. Standard of Review 
"Where the district court conducts a trial de novo in an appeal of a [Board of Tax 
Appeals] decision, this Court defers to the district court's findings of fact that are supported by 
substantial evidence, but exercises free review over the district court's conclusions of law." 
Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417, 419-20, 247 P.3d 644, 646-47 (2011) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted). 
There are no disputes regarding any factual findings in this case; rather, the only matters 
for review are the District Court's legal conclusions. Thus, over these legal conclusions, this 
Court exercises "free review." Kimbrough, 150 Idaho at 419-20, 247 P.3d at 646-47; see also 
Mann v. Granite Reeder Water & Sewer Dist., 143 Idaho 248,251, 141 P.3d 1117, 1120 (2006). 
II. Summary of the Argument 
This appeal presents the straightforward legal issue of whether the District Court was 
correct that Linda Dunn's share of community income is taxable in Idaho. To be clear, the 
District Court was correct: Linda Dunn has a community property interest in her husband's 
wages, and as an Idaho resident, she is required to pay tax on that community income. 
First, the wages that her husband, Barry Dunn, earned in Texas and Washington are 
community property under those states' laws. (Appellant's Brief does not substantively address 
the District Court's determination as to Washington law in this appeal. Accordingly, the 
Commission will address Washington law only briefly below.) In tum, the District Court 
correctly followed Idaho law which holds that the income Linda Dunn received from her one-
half interest in her husband's wages, is taxable, even if those wages were earned out-of-state. 




Finally, the District Court was correct that there are no constitutional violations here. 
Both the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause are not implicated by the 
facts of this case. Appellant's Brief maintains that Idaho is unconstitutionally reaching beyond 
its borders and directly taxing a non-resident for non-Idaho sourced income. It is not; it is simply 
attributing her interest in her husband's wages to her, just as this Court approved of in Parker v. 
Idaho State Tax Commission, 148 Idaho 842, 230 P.3d 734 (2010). As the District Court noted, 
the only interest subject to Idaho tax liability is Linda Dunn's interest in community property. 
Following Idaho legal precedent, the District Court correctly concluded that the taxation of Linda 
Dunn's one-half interest in Barry Dunn's Texas and Washington earnings does not at all violate 
the Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
The arguments in Appellant's Brief rest on one faulty assumption: that the Tax 
Commission is trying to tax a non-resident. To be clear, the Commission is not claiming that 
Barry Dunn owed Idaho tax on his one-half share of his Texas or Washington earnings. The 
Commission has not assessed any tax liability on Barry Dunn's interest in his earnings. 
Moreover, income received from an out-of-state source is clearly taxable. 
The District Court was correct in its legal conclusions; its determinations in favor of the 
Commission should be affirmed. 
III. Because Linda Dunn has a community property interest in her 
husband's wages, the District Court correctly determined that 
such income was taxable. 
Linda Dunn was a resident of Idaho for the taxable years. Therefore, all her income-
from whatever source derived, and even from a source outside Idaho-is taxable in Idaho. See 
Idaho Code§§ 63-3002 and -3013; see also Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335,393 P.2d 35 (1964). 












Her husband, Barry Dunn, earned wages in Texas and Washington that are community 
property. The District Court correctly analyzed Texas and Washington law to determine that 
Barry Dunn's wages during the relevant years were community income.2 As a member of the 
marital community, Linda Dunn owns a one-half interest in the income earned by her spouse. 
A. The wages Barry Dunn earned in Texas and Washington are 
community property under those states' laws. 
By way of reminder, Barry Dunn generally lived and had his place of domicile in those 
states in which he was working. Specifically, Barry Dunn was domiciled in Washington in 2000-
2001, and was domiciled in Texas during 2003-2010. Linda Dunn was domiciled in Idaho for all 
the taxable years. 
We will now analyze the laws of the states where Barry Dunn earned his wages. 
Texas: 
The wages that Barry Dunn earned in Texas are community property. Appellant's Brief 
contends that, applying a particular Texas statute, Barry Dunn's wages were the equivalent of 
separate property. This is not accurate, as Texas case law makes it clear that his wages are 
community property in which his spouse has a one-half interest, as explained below. 
In general, "community property under Texas law consists of all property either spouse 
acquired during the marriage 'other than separate property."' Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W.2d 879, 
2 It is arguable that Idaho community property law (and not Texas or Washington law) should have 
controlled whether Barry Dunn's income was community property. However, the Commission has not 
asserted that position in this case. Generally, the Commission takes the position that the laws applicable 
to marital assets will largely be determined by the spouses' domiciles (i.e., a person's income living in a 
community property state is community income, and a person's income in a non-community property 
state is separate income). See Idaho State Tax Commission Publication 175 COMMUNITY PROPERTY, 
https://tax.idaho.gov, Rev. Oct. 15, 2012, at 2-3. This position mirrors the federal taxation scheme. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.66-1 ("Treatment of community income") (providing that the law of the state where one 
is domiciled governs whether there is community income or separate income for federal tax purposes). 






883 (Tex. 1999) (citing Tex. Fam. Code§ 3.002); see also Texas Constitution, article XVI, sect. 
15. In fact, like Idaho, there is a presumption in Texas law that all property held by the spouses 
is community property. Tex. Fam. Code§ 3.003. A spouse who wishes to rebut that 
presumption in order to show that property is separate property, must do so "by clear and 
convincing evidence." Tex. Fam. Code§ 3.003. 
In Texas, the characterization of property as either community property or separate 
property is determined at the time of its acquisition, or at the "inception of title to the property." 
Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605,612 (Tex. App. 2004) (internal citations omitted). "[A]ny 
spouse's personal income is community property." McClary v. Thompson, 65 S.W.3d 829, 834 
(Tex. App. 2002) (internal citations omitted); see also Maben v. Maben, 574 S.W.2d 229, 232 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (personal earnings are community property if earned during marriage). 
This brings us to the feature of Texas community property law that Appellant's Brief 
focuses on: Texas recognizes both sole-management and joint-management of community 
property. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.102 ("Managing Community Property"). Sole-management 
community property is sometimes also known as "special community property." See Valdez v. 
Ramirez, 574 S.W.2d 748, 750-51 (Tex.1978). (This brief will use the term most commonly used 
in Texas case law: "sole-management community property.") 
What is the nature of sole-management community property? The statute provides that, 
during marriage, "each spouse has the sole management, control, and disposition of the 
community property that the spouse would have owned if single, including: ... personal 
earnings." Tex. Fam. Code§ 3.102. Simply put, sole-management community property is 
community property that is subject to one spouse's "sole management, control, and disposition." 











Valdez, 574 S.W.2d at 750-51; see also Medenco, Inc. v. Myklebust, 615 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. 
1981). 
Because of this sole-management feature, Appellant's Brief maintains that Barry Dunn 
had sole-management over his Texas earnings, and that, therefore, this is the equivalent of it 
being separate property. Said in the negative, Appellant's Brief argues that Linda Dunn 
functionally had no rights to the money that Barry Dunn earned, and therefore, his wages were 
not actually community property in the normal meaning of the term. Appellant's Brief is unable 
to identify a single case that supports its theory.3 
To the contrary, Texas law is clear that the sole-management community property is not 
the equivalent of separate property. First, the non-management spouse still retains a community 
property interest in the sole-management community property. "Each spouse owns an undivided 
one-half interest in all community assets and funds regardless of which spouse has management 
and control." Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391,401 (Tex. App. 1991) (emphasis added).4 
(Tellingly, in the Appellant's Brief, there is no mention of the Massey case.) Here, Linda Dunn 
still owned an undivided one-half interest in all community assets-including the personal 
earnings of Barry Dunn during the taxable years-regardless of the fact that Barry Dunn may 
have been given sole management, control or disposition. 
Second, this argument is incorrect because, under Texas law, Barry Dunn's wages were 
never transmuted from community property to separate property. Generally, the character of 
3 Appellant's Brief relies on Douglas v. Delp, 987 S.W. 2d 879 (Tex. 1999). However, other than the 
basic statements of community property law (see discussion above), Douglas does not further Linda 
Dunn's particular legal argument. This is because Douglas holds merely that where one spouse had filed 
a bankruptcy, the other spouse lacked standing in state court to recover damages for injury to the 
community estate, but needed to pursue the matter in bankruptcy court. Id., 987 S.W.2d at 883. 
4 See also Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (each spouse owns an 
undivided one-half interest in all community assets and funds regardless of which spouse has 
management and control). 




earnings as community property attaches when those earnings accrue. Loaiza v. Loaiza. 130 
S.W.3d 894, 909 (Tex. App. 2004) (cited by the District Court, R., p. 117).5 Here, the wages of 
Barry Dunn were community property from the moment he acquired the wages and did not later 
. 6 transmute mto separate property. 
Thus, the fact that Barry Dunn's personal earnings in Texas can be considered to be sole-
management community property with special management privileges, does not change the 
earnings' characterization as community property in which Linda Dunn has an interest. The 
District Court correctly determined that, even though sole-management community property 
does possess some of the characteristics of separate property, "this characterization [as sole-
management community property] does not divest the non-earning spouse of her one-half 
undivided interest in those wages, nor does it transmute those wages from community property 
to separate property as [Linda Dunn] suggests." R., p. 118. 
Finally, Appellant's Brief presents one other argument. This argument relies on Tex. 
Fam. Code§ 3.202 ("Rules of Marital Property Liability"), which provides that sole-
management community property is not subject to any nontortious liability that the other spouse 
5 Texas law does allow spouses to transmute all or part of their community property into separate 
property, but this is accomplished via an "exchange" between themselves. Tex. Fam. Code § 4.102. 
Such property, when exchanged, becomes that spouse's separate property. Id. Such an exchange must be 
accomplished by a writing and signed by the parties. Tex. Fam. Code § 4.104. Here, there is no evidence 
of a written exchange or transfer of community property. It is stipulated that Barry Dunn derived the 
Texas income in Texas, while a Texas resident. The record shows that Barry Dunn's earnings in Texas 
retained their status as community property. His income is community property which was never 
transmuted into separate property via an exchange. 
6 Appellant's Brief cites to Perez v. Perez, 587 S.W.2d 671 (S.C. Texas 1979). But Perez merely 
analyzed whether a military benefit was community versus separate property. It says nothing about sole-
management community property being considered to be separate property. Nor does it hold that a non-
earning spouse has no rights to the other spouse's personal earnings. Reference to Perez is not helpful in 
this case. 











incurs during marriage. ld.7 Appellant's Brief concludes that Barry Dunn's special community 
property earnings therefore are not subject to liability for the debts incurred by Linda Dunn. 8 
However, Section 3.202, Tex. Fam. Code, does not operate as a bar against Linda Dunn 
paying tax in Idaho on her one-half share of community income. By its plain language, Section 
3.202, Tex. Fam. Code, merely prohibits a creditor from attaching sole-management community 
property to satisfy the other spouse's debt. As the District Court correctly noted, though, the 
Commission "is not seeking the wages of Mr. Dunn to satisfy a debt, rather, it is assessing a tax 
on [Linda Dunn] for her one-half interest to income earned during marriage." R., p. 119.9 
In conclusion, the District Court was correct when it perceived the issue before it, 
whether Linda Dunn "had a vested interest in the community property of the marriage." R., p. 
119. It correctly noted that under Texas law, Linda Dunn did have a one-half undivided interest 
in the Texas earnings of Barry Dunn. R., p. 119. Because Linda Dunn's domicile at the time she 
received an interest in Barry Dunn's wages was Idaho, "as an Idaho resident, [her] one-half 
interest in [his] income is subject to the tax laws of the State of Idaho." R., p. 120. 
7 Section 3.202, Tex. Fam. Code, provides: "Unless both spouses are personally liable as provided by this 
subchapter, the community property subject to a spouse's sole management, control, and disposition is 
not subject to: ... any nontortious liabilities that the other spouse incurs during marriage." Id. 
8 The Appellant's Brief cites several other cases in support of its position, including Beal Bank v. Gilbert, 
417 S.W. 3d 704 (Tex. App. 2013), Montemayor v. Ortiz, 208 S.W. 3d 627 (Tex. App. 2006), and In re 
Hall, 559 B.R. 463,466 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016). These cases do not apply here because they are 
factually distinguishable in that the Commission is not seeking payment from Barry Dunn's separate 
income or his sole-management community property. 
9 The Appellant's Brief objects to the District Court having analyzed the Texas case of Kimsey v. Kimsey, 
965 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App. 1998), because the case deals with federal tax liability, and not state tax 
liability. But the District Court recognized this factual difference and weighed the import of the case 
accordingly. The rationale of Kimsey is applicable to the facts in this case. Moreover, even though a 
federal tax was at issue, that distinction does not matter. The point of citing to Kimsey is to show that 
under Texas law "if a spouse can be responsible for the entire tax liability of the marriage, they are 
responsible for the liability of both spouses even if the liable party is the non-earning spouse." R., p. 119. 
Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that "a non-earning spouse may have tax liability 
even where the income would be considered special community property." R., p. 119. 





Under Washington law, Barry Dunn's wages earned and acquired there are community 
property. Linda Dunn had a vested interest in the community property wages earned by her 
spouse. The District Court correctly analyzed how the wages earned in Washington for the 
taxable years are community income, and how Linda Dunn's community interest in those wages 
are taxable in Idaho. See Memo Dec., R., pp. 120-21. No party has appealed this determination. 
B. Under Idaho law, Linda Dunn must report the income she 
received from her one-half interest in her husband's wages, 
even if those wages were earned out-of-state. 
In doing an analysis of other states' laws, the question to be answered only pertains to the 
characterization of the income earned in those states as community or separate property. What is 
not in question is Idaho's own ability to impose tax on its own residents' income. This is an 
important distinction because the Appellant's Brief conflates the two concepts. 10 
Under Idaho law, an individual's residency affects ones income tax liability. See Idaho 
Code§§ 63-3002 and-3013. That's because a person's residency determines what income the 
State of Idaho can tax. In Idaho, it is the intent of the legislature to impose a tax on Idaho 
residents' income "wherever derived." Idaho Code§ 63-3002; see also Idaho Code§§ 63-
301 lB, -301 lC; I.R.C. §§ 61, 63. Thus, as an Idaho resident, Linda Dunn is taxed on all of the 
income she received during the taxable years while living in Idaho. 
Moreover, a resident's income is taxed regardless of where it is actually earned. This 
Court has explained that there is no constitutional prohibition against a state's exercise of power 
10 For example, just because Texas law may apply in determining whether Barry Dunn's Texas wages are 
community or separate property, it does not mean that Idaho is somehow invading Texas and seizing 
Barry Dunn's wages; nor does it even mean that it is taxing Barry Dunn's Texas wages. The bottom line 
is that Idaho is taxing whatever community property income its resident, Linda Dunn, owns due to the 
wages earned by her husband. 











to tax a resident's income derived from sources outside the state. Herndon, 87 Idaho at 340, 393 
P.2d at 37.11 
Appellant's Brief cites to no case that cuts against this principle.12 (Inexplicably, 
Appellant's Brief does not even cite to Herndon.) To the contrary, this Court has recently re-
asserted the precedent in Herndon. In Parker, this Court cited to Herndon for support that there 
is nothing in the Tax Commission's act of taxing the wife's community property share of 
income-even though that income was derived from the husband's earnings out-of-state-to 
implicate the Due Process Clause. Parker, 148 Idaho at 847,230 P.3d at 739. 
The District Court said it best: 
In the present case Mr. Dunn earned wages in Washington and Texas during the 
years in question. At no time was Mr. Dunn a resident of Idaho. [Linda Dunn] 
was a resident of Idaho during all relevant years. During that time Mr. Dunn's 
wages can be properly characterized as the property of the marital community 
pursuant to Texas, Washington, and Idaho law. As a resident of Idaho [Linda 
Dunn's] interest in Mr. Dunn's wages is attributable to her as income and as such, 
is taxable by the State of Idaho. 
R., p. 122. 
Appellant's Brief has cited to no legal authority that stands for the proposition that a state 
may not tax its residents on income from out-of-state sources. The District Court should be 
affirmed. 
11 This Court explained in Herndon that "[t]he rationale for allowing a state to compute a tax on income 
earned elsewhere is based on the premise that inhabitants are supplied many services by their state of 
residence and should contribute toward the support of the state, no matter where their income is earned." 
Herndon, 87 Idaho at 340,393 P.2d at 37. 
12 Appellant's Brief argues that the holding in Blangers v. State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 114 
Idaho 944, 763 P.2d 1052 (1988) would prevent the taxation here. However, Blangers dealt with taxation 
of non-residents in Idaho who temporarily passed through Idaho on business. Its holding is inapplicable 
here because, in this case, there is no non-resident being taxed by Idaho. 




IV. The District Court was correct that there are no constitutional 
violations here. 
The facts of this case present no violation of the United States Commerce Clause, or the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
A. The Commerce Clause is not implicated by the facts of this 
case. 
Appellant's Brief argues that there is violation of the U.S. Commerce Clause, Article I, § 
8 of the U.S. Constitution. In Parker, as in this case, one Idaho resident argued that taxing her 
husband's out-of-state earnings would violate the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8 of the 
U.S. Constitution. "To show that the Commerce Clause is implicated by a tax statute, [a 
taxpayer] must demonstrate that the state's taxation of [her] entire income has a substantial effect 
on an identifiable interstate economic activity or market." Parker, 148 Idaho at 847, 230 P.3d at 
739 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Thus, the District Court below accurately held that Linda Dunn needed to show that "the 
application ofldaho's taxing statute somehow substantially affects interstate commerce for the 
Commerce Clause to be implicated." Memo. Dec., R., p. 122 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549,559, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626,632 (1995)). Appellant's Brief has 
failed to identify any interstate economic activity or market that is burdened by the taxation of 
Linda Dunn's community income. The Commerce Clause is not implicated in this case. See 
Parker, 148 Idaho at 847,230 P.3d at 739. 
In particular, Appellant's Brief postulates that the holding in Comptroller of Treasury of 
Maryland v. Wynne effectively renders Idaho's personal income tax scheme unconstitutional, as 
a violation of the "dormant Commerce Clause." 135 S. Ct. 178, 191 L. Ed. 2d 813 (2015). 
Appellant's Brief incorrectly reasons that the Constitution restricts the Commission because 













Barry Dunn's income is "affected" even though he was not an Idaho resident. As explained 
below the Supreme Court's decision in Wynne neither requires nor suggests this outcome. 
Indeed, the "internal consistency test" described by the U.S. Supreme Court in that case supports 
the Tax Commission's imposition of tax on Linda Dunn's income. This argument is a red 
herring. 
In Wynne, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the negative stroke of the Commerce Clause 
of the Constitution prohibited Maryland from "tax[ing] a transaction more heavily when it 
crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the state." 135 S. Ct. at 1790 (internal 
quotation omitted). Specifically, the Court found that one of Maryland's statewide income taxes, 
called a "county" income tax, violated the Commerce Clause as Maryland did not permit 
Maryland taxpayers to apply a credit for taxes paid to other states against the "county" tax. 135 
S. Ct. at 1792. The Court reasoned that by not permitting taxpayers to apply such a credit, 
Maryland subjected them to the risk of double taxation as the "county" tax did not account for 
income apportioned to other states. 135 S. Ct. at 1795. 
First, as to the issue of a credit for taxes paid to other states, Appellant's Brief has neither 
argued nor provided any evidence that Linda Dunn is entitled to such a credit in any state. This 
case merely presents the question of how to tax Linda Dunn's one-half, community-property 
interest in her husband's wages. But no party here actually paid any income tax to Texas. 
(Texas has no individual income tax.) As such there simply is no credit for out-of-state taxes to 
claim. Reliance on Wynne is misplaced as this matter has nothing to do with offering credit for 
taxes paid to other states. 13 
13 Appellant's Brief cites to Corrigan v. Testa, _N.E.3d_, 2016 WL 2341977 (S.C. Ohio, 2016) in its 
discussion of Wynne. But Corrigan dealt with the question whether a state could directly tax a non-
resident. In the present case, unlike the facts in Corrigan, the Commission is taxing its own resident. 
Corrigan is inapt. 




Second, Appellant's Brief unnecessarily calls this Court's attention to the internal 
consistency test that the U.S. Supreme Court uses in Wynne. Appellant's Brief cites to this test 
in an attempt to demonstrate that Linda Dunn, an Idaho taxpayer with an interest in wages earned 
out-of-state, is receiving inconsistent treatment between Texas and Idaho. Appellant's Brief 
points out that in Texas, this income went untaxed, and argues that it is violative of the internal 
consistency test for Idaho to impose a tax on that income. But this argument shows a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the internal consistency test. 
The internal consistency test does not require that each state adopt identical tax 
provisions. 14 Instead, it merely poses the following question: "If every state used the same tax 
scheme, would interstate commerce be at a disadvantage as compared to intrastate commerce?" 
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802. If the answer to this question is "no," then the analyzed tax scheme 
passes the internal consistency test. 15 
Because Appellant's Brief has not provided evidence or argument to demonstrate that 
Linda Dunn was entitled to a credit for taxes paid to another state, the Wynne case simply does 
not apply. Furthermore, Idaho's tax scheme easily passes the internal consistency test employed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. For all these reasons, there is no Commerce Clause problem. 
14 As the Court stated in Wynne, "Maryland could remedy the infirmity in its tax scheme by offering, as 
most States do, a credit against income taxes paid to other States .... If it did, Maryland's tax scheme 
would survive the internal consistency test and would not be inherently discriminatory." Wynne, 135 S. 
Ct. at 1805 (internal citation omitted). Idaho does provide a credit for income taxes paid to other states. 
Idaho Code§ 63-3029. 
15 In this matter, while the use of the internal consistency test is unnecessary, the Idaho tax scheme passes 
it easily. It is unnecessary to apply this test as there is no out-of-state taxpayer being taxed. Even in its 
application, if every state adopted Idaho's tax scheme-including its provision for credit for taxes paid to 
another state-its imposition of tax upon a resident's one-half community property interest in out-of-state 
wages would not be treated comparatively better than a similarly situated taxpayer also paying tax to 
another state. The latter, multi-state taxpayer would simply receive a credit for out-of-state taxes paid and 
would not be burdened with additional tax liability. 









B. There is no violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
Appellant's Brief also argues that the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Article IV, 
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, applies here to invalidate Idaho's taxation of Linda Dunn. 
This is not the case; there is no violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause provides that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Id. Generally speaking 
this means that states are prohibited from discrimination against citizens of other states where 
there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of 
other states. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396, 68 S. Ct. 1156, 1162, 92 L. Ed. 1460 
(1948). 
In the case of taxation, the Privileges and Immunities Clause stands for the proposition 
that a state must offer "substantial equality of treatment" as between its citizens and the 
nonresident taxpayer. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656,665, 95 S. Ct. 1191, 1197, 43 L. 
Ed. 2d 530 (1975). Thus, this Court invalidated a statute that provided a larger tax credit to Idaho 
residents than it did to non-residents. State ex rel. Haworth v. Berntsen, 68 Idaho 539, 543-46, 
200 P.2d 1007, 1008-10 (1948). 
Here, however, as the District Court determined, "there can be no violation of the 
privileges and immunities clause because [Linda Dunn] has not shown disparate treatment 
between non-resident and resident tax liability. Again, it is not the income attributable to Mr. 
Dunn that is being taxed; [the Commission] is taxing only [Linda Dunn's] vested one-half 
interest in Mr. Dunn's wages." R., p. 125.16 
16 Appellant's Brief here relies on Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 288, 118 S. Ct. 
766, 769, 139 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1998). However, that case is easily distinguished on the facts here. In 
Lunding, the Supreme Court invalidated a state tax that expressly discriminated against non-residents. 
Here, there is no showing of discriminatory tax treatment of non-residents relative to residents. 




The Commission is not seeking to impose a tax on the husband, Barry Dunn. Therefore, 
there is no occasion of Barry Dunn having to pay tax in Idaho greater than what he paid in 
another state. This argument is without substance. Rather, Linda Dunn owes tax for her one-
half share of the wages earned by her husband, as those wages are income attributable to her. 
Parker, 148 Idaho at 847,230 P.3d at 739. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs arguments all seem to flow from the view that the State of Idaho is 
somehow directly taxing Barry Dunn's wages. However, that view is simply incorrect. The 
taxation in this case is not on Barry Dunn or his wages; the only taxation here is on the income of 
Linda Dunn, an Idaho resident. The taxes imposed on Linda Dunn's income are proper, correct, 
and constitutional. 
For this and the reasons stated above, the order of the District Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this '3 f day of January 2017. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent/Defendant. 
3'32~ 
CASE NO. CV-15-H8r 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Linda Dunn ("Petitioner,.) filed this petition for judicial review from a final decision of 
the Idaho State Tax Commission ("Defendant''). Petitioner and Defendant have filed a joint 
stipulation of facts and submitted the matter to the Court on the briefing. Petitioner is represented 
by Robert E. Kovacevich, Attorney at Law, and Richard W. Kochansky, Attorney at Law. 
Defendant is represented by David B. Young, Deputy Attorney General. 
I. FACTS 
The facts herein are taken from the Joint Stipulation of Facts submitted by the parties on 
February 22, 2011. This is an agency appeal from a decision of the Idaho Tax Commission 
entered on April 171 2015. This appeal was timely filed with this Court. Petitioner paid the 
security deposit required to allow this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 63-3049(b). 
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Petitioner was married to Barry Dunn for all the years relevant to this action. The taxable 
years at issue are: 2000-01, 2003-05, and 2007-10. During the years in question Mr. Dunn 
worked for Ude1hoven Inc., a Texas company. Mr. Dunn generally lived and had his place of 
domicile in those states in which he was working. At no time was Mr. Dunn domiciled in the 
State of Idaho. Mr. Dunn resided in Washington in 2000 and was domiciled in Washington or 
Alaska in 2001. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Alaska during 2002. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in 
Alaska or Texas during 2003. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Texas from 2004 through 2010. 
Petitioner was domiciled in Idaho during all of the years in question. 
All of the wages earned by Mr. Dunn were deposited into his bank account in the city of 
Tomball, Texas. Mr. Dunn never performed any work, or earned any wages in the State of 
Idaho. Petitioner and Mr. Dunn filed federal tax returns as married filing jointly during the years 
in question. The Idaho State Tax Commission levied a deficiency against Petitioner's one-half 
community property interest in Mr. Dunn's wages. The decision entered by the Idaho Tax 
Commission was only addressed to income Defendant attributed to Petitioner. Mr. Dunn passed 
away in 2012. To date there has been no probate of Mr. Dunn's estate. 
Petitioner argues the earnings of Mr. Dunn in Texas were special community property 
and cannot be subject to the debts of Petitioner. Further, Petitioner argues Idaho's taxation of 
wages earned by a non-resident spouse violates the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and 
Inununities Clause of the United States Constitutions. Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision 
of the Idaho State Tax Commission, a refund of all amounts paid for the years in question, and 
that Petitioner be paid interest on the amounts paid. 
Defendant argues that it has not imposed a tax on Mr. Dunn, rather it has imposed 
personal income tax on Petitioner reflecting her one-half community interest in the earnings of 
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Mr. Dunn. Defendant avers that Petitioner is required to report her income and pay tax in Idaho 
on her income regardless of the source of that income. Defendant argues that both Texas and 
Washington are community property states and both recognize that a non-earning spouse has a 
one-half vested interest in the wages earned by the earning spouse. Further, Defendant argues 
that as a resident Petitioner is subject to the tax provisions of the State of Idaho. Defendant 
requests the Complaint be dismissed, the decision of the Idaho State Tax Com.mission be 
affirmed, and all of Defendant's costs and reasonable attorneys, fees incurred in defending this 
action be awarded. 
I. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
A taxpayer may request review of a decision by the Tax Commission to the district court 
by filing a complaint against the Tax Commission pursuant to Idaho Code§ 63-3049. "The case 
proceeds as a de novo bench trial in the district court." Parker v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 148 
Idaho 842, 845, 230 P.3d 734, 737 (2010). The reviewing court will proceed with the review as 
it would any other civil case. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 
790, 793, 134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006). The court will utilize the Commission record only as the 
stated position of a party to the civil action. Id. 
II. DISCUSSION 
1. Character oftbe Wages of Mr. Dunn. 
a. In Texas property is characterized as community or separate at the time 
property is acquired. 
Characterization of property is determined by the time and circumstances of its 
acquisition. Leighton v. Leighton, 921 S.W.2d 365,367 (Tex.App 1996) citing Carter v. Carter, 
736 S. W.2d 775, 780 (Tex.App. 1987). "This doctrine, lmown as inception of title, arises when a 
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party first has right of claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested." Scott v. 
Estate a/Scott, 973 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.App. 1998). 
Personal earnings are community property if earned during marriage. Maben v. Maben, 
574 S.W.2d 229,232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Though personal earnings are community property, 
Texas law has classified this kind of community property as "special community." Valdez v. 
Ramirez, 574 S.W.2d 748, 750-51 (Tex.1978). "Special community is community property that 
is subject to one spouse's sole management, control, and disposition." Valdez, 514 S.W.2d at 
750-51. Personal earnings are subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of the 
employee spouse. Medenco, Inc. v. Myklebust, 615 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. 1981). Each spouse 
owns an undivided one-half interest in all community assets and funds regardless of which 
spouse has management and control. Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1975). Generally, the character of earnings as community property attaches when those earnings 
accrue. Loaiza v. Loaiza, 130 S.W.3d 894,909 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004). 
Petitioner argues that Texas law applies to the wages of Mr. Dunn and treats those wages 
as Mr. Dunn's separate property. Reply Brief L. Dunn at 2. Petitioner avers that she had no 
enforceable right to her husband's wages because Mr. Dunn exercised sole dominion and control 
over his earnings. Id. Therefore, Petitioner argues that because she had no right in the wages of 
her husband the wages cannot be transmuted into community property for purposes of income in 
Idaho. Id. Moreover, Petitioner argues that because Mr. Dunn's earnings are special community 
property Mr. Dunn's earnings are not subject to liability for the debts incurred by Petitioner. 
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4. 
Defendant argues that while the law of the state where the wages were earned determines 
the character of the property at issue, Texas law provides that wages earned during marriage are 
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community property. Defendant's Reply Brief at 3. Defendant contends that Petitioner's one-
half interest in the wages of Mr. Dunn is properly subject to personal income tax in the State of 
Idaho. Id. 
Texas case law makes clear that wages earned during marriage are community property. 
There is no dispute that Petitioner and Mr. Dunn were married during the period of time in 
question. Mr. Dunn was domiciled in Texas during the years in question. Petitioner was 
domiciled in Idaho during this same period. The issues regarding the Texas wages earned by Mr. 
Dunn are whether Petitioner had a one-half interest in those wages and whether wages 
characterized as special community property are treated as separate property for purposes of 
Petitioner's Idaho income tax. 
Wages earned by a spouse domiciled in Texas are presumptively community property 
and each spouse owns a one-half undivided interest in those wages. See Maben, 574 S.W.2d 
229,232. Where those wages are earned by one spouse and are subject to the sole management 
and control of the earning spouse, Texas law characterizes them as special community property. 
Valdez, 574 S.W.2d at 750-51. However, this characterization does not divest the non-earning 
spouse of her one-half undivided interest in those wages, nor does it transmute those wages from 
community property to separate property as Petitioner suggests. Petitioner's one-half undivided 
interest in Mr. Dunn's wages vested at the same time Mr. DW111's interest vested: when they were 
earned. 
Special community property does possess some of the characteristics of separate 
property. However, Petitioner's argument that special community property cannot be liable for 
the tax liability of the non-earning spouse is not supported in the law. In Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 
S. W .2d 690 (Ct. App. Texas 1998), the Texas Court of Appeals held: 
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While the trial court can determine whether the parties will file a 
joint return or as married filing separately for years preceding the 
divorce, the court cannot alter the means of reporting income. It 
does have the discretion to apportion the payment of taxes as 
between the parties. . . . Thus, a spouse may be liable for the 
entire tax liability although the income was totally earned by 
the other spouse. If a husband and wife file as married filing 
separately, each is liable only for the tax due on his or her own 
return. See Edith Stokby v. C.J.R., 26 T.C. 912, 1956 WL 
725(A)( 1956). 
Kimsey v. Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d 690, 696 (Tex. App. 1998) (emphasis added). While Kimsey 
dealt with liability of a spouse regarding federal taxes, the rationale sounds in the present case. It 
follows that if a spouse can be responsible for the entire tax liability of the marriage, they are 
responsible for the liability of both spouses even if the liable party is the non-earning spouse. 
Thus, a non-earning spouse may have tax liability even where the income would be considered 
special community property. Further, Defendant is not seeking the wages of Mr. Dunn to satisfy 
a debt, rather, it is assessing a tax on Petitioner for her one-half interest in income earned during 
marriage. 
This Court is to determine whether Petitioner had a vested interest in the community 
property of the marriage. Under Texas law, as well as Idaho law, this Court determines that 
Petitioner did have an interest in Mr. Dunn's wages. 
Further, the tax liability in the present case is based on Petitioner's one-half undivided 
interest in the Texas earnings of Mr. Dunn. The interest in the earnings of Mr. Dunn vested in 
Petitioner at the time they accrued. The Court determines that Texas law is dispositive of the 
character of the earnings. Once that characterization is made (as it is here) that Petitioner had a 
one-half undivided interest in the wages then Idaho law applies to Petitioner's interest in those 
wages based on Petitioner's domicile in Idaho. The state of domicile at the time property is 
acquired determines the characterization of property as community or separate. See Berle v. 
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Berle, 97 Idaho 452, 546 P .2d 407 (1976) (finding marital property acquired in New Jersey prior 
to couple relocating in Idaho was characterized by the law of the domicile at the time of 
acquisition). Petitioner's domicile at the time she received an interest in Mr. Dunn's wages was 
Idaho. Therefore, as an Idaho resident, Petitioner's one-half interest in Mr. Dunn's income is 
subject to the tax laws of the State ofldaho. 
b. In Washington property is characterized as community or separate at the 
time property is acquired. 
The character of property is deteIII1ined by the law of the domicile at the time of its 
acquisition. In re Marriage of Landry, 699 P.2d 214,216 (Wash. 1985). "The theory underlying 
community property is that it is obtained by the efforts of either the husband or wife, or both, for 
the benefit of the community." Togliatti v. Robertson, 190 P.2d 575 (Wash. 1948). However, 
Revised Code of Washington § 26.16.140 provides that the respective earnings of a husband and 
wife who are living separate and apart "shall be the separate property of each." See Beakley v. 
Bremerton, 105 P.2d 40 (Wash. 1940) (citing Revised Code of Washington§ 26.16.140). "The 
law distinguishes between a 'marital' and a 'community' relationship, the latter concept 
encompassing more than mere satisfaction of the legal requirements of marriage. It is the fact of 
community that gives rise to the community property statute; when there is no 'community', 
there can be no community property." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bunt, 754 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Wash. 
1988), opinion modified on denial of reconsideration (July 28, 1988). 
In order for earnings attributed to one spouse to be considered the separate property of 
the earning spouse there must be some showing that the marriage is defunct. MacKenzie v. 
Sellner, 361 P.2d 165 (Wash. 1961). The Washington Supreme Court has defined defunct as 
follows: 
A marriage is considered "defunct" when both parties to the 
marriage no longer have the will to continue the marital 
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relationship. In other words, when the deserted spouse accepts the 
futility of hope for restoration of a nonnal marital relationship, or 
just acquiesces in the separation, the marriage is considered 
"defunct" so that the "living separate and apart0 statute applies. 
In re Marriage of Short, 890 P.2d 12 (Wash. 1995) (internal citations omitted). 
In the present case Mr. Dunn,s wages earned in Washington is properly considered 
commwtlty property. There has been no showing that the marriage between Mr. Du.•1n and 
Petitioner was defunct. In order for Mr. Dunn's wages to be considered his separate property 
Petitioner is required to demonstrate there was no nounal marital relationship and there was hope 
for restoration of the unity. This Court detennines that Petitioner's marriage to Mr. Dunn was 
not defunct as that term is understood under Washington law. Therefore, Petitioner had a vested 
interest in the community property wages earned by Mr. Dunn in the State of Washington. As 
with the wages earned in Texas, the wages earned in Washington are subject to taxation under 
the laws of the State of Idaho as the domicile of Petitioner. 
c. Wages earned outside of Idaho by a non-resident spouse are attributable as 
income to a resident non-earning spouse. 
"Idaho Code § 32-906( I) defines as community property all property acquired after 
marriage by either husband or wife which is not separate property as specified in I.C. § 32-903." 
Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 354, 360, 815 P.2d 1094, 1100 (Ct. App. 1991). The Idaho 
Court of Appeals held that all earning of either spouse were to be included as community 
property up until the date of divorce. Suter v. Suter, 97 Idaho 461, 546 P.2d 1169 (1976). This 
includes earnings during any separation. Id. A resident non-earning spouse is generally subject 
to personal income tax in Idaho for her community property interest in wages earned in another 
state by a non-resident spouse. Parker v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 148 Idaho 842, 230 P .3d 734 
(2010). Wages earned by a non-resident spouse in another state are attributable as personal 
income to the resident spouse. Id. 
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In Parker the Court quoted: 
The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that a 
state has the power to tax in relation to a resident's income derived 
from sources outside the State and that there is nothing in the 
Federal Constitution to prevent the exercise of such power. The 
rationale for allowing a state to compute a tax on income earned 
elsewhere is based on the premise that inhabitants are supplied 
many services by their state of residence and should contribute 
toward the support of the state, no matter where their income is 
earned. 
Id., 148 Idaho at 846-47, 230 P.3d at 738-39 (quoting Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 393 P.2d 
35 (1964)). 
In the present case Mr. Dunn earned wages in Washington and Texas during the years in 
question. At no time was Mr. Dunn a resident of Idaho. Petitioner was a resident of Idaho 
during all relevant years. During that time Mr. Dunn's wages can be properly characterized as 
the property of the marital community pursuant to Texas, Washington. and Idaho law. As a 
resident of Idaho Petitioner's interest in Mr. Dunn's wages is attributable to her as income and as 
such, is taxable by the State ofldaho. 
2. The Commerce Clause. 
"To show that the Commerce Clause is implicated by a tax statute, [a taxpayer] must 
demonstrate that the state's taxation of [her] entire income has a substantial effect on an 
identifiable interstate economic activity or market." Parker v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 148 
Idaho 842,847,230 P.3d 734, 739 (2010) (quoting 71 Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation§ 391 
(2009)(citing Stelzner v. Comm'r of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.2001)). 
Petitioner must show that application of Idaho's taxing statute somehow substantially 
affects interstate commerce for the Commerce Clause to be implicated. United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 559, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995). Commerce is defined as "the commercial 
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553, 
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115 S.Ct. 1624 (citation and internal quotation omitted). The purpose of the dormant Commerce 
Clause is not "to protect state residents from their own state taxes." Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 
252, 266, 109 S.Ct. 582 (1989). Rather, "[t]he dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and 
participants in markets." General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300, 117 S.Ct. 811 
(1997). Therefore, Petitioner must make an initial showing that Idaho's income tax statute has a 
substantial effect on an identifiable interstate economic activity or market. 
In Parker the Petitioner sought judicial review of a tax assessment based on one-half of 
her husband's Nevada income. Parker, 148 Idaho at 847,230 P.3d at 739. The petitioner argued 
that Idaho's taxation of her interest in her husband's income violated the Commerce Clause. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held: 
"The dormant Corrunerce Clause protects markets and 
participants in markets, not taxpayers as such." Gen. Motors Corp. 
v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278. 300 [117 S.Ct. 811,825, 136 L.Ed.2d 761, 
781] (1997). Therefore, the dormant Commerce Clause will not 
apply unless there is actual or prospective competition between 
entities in an identifiable market and state action that either 
expressly discriminates against or places an undue burden on 
interstate commerce. Tracy, 519 U.S. at 300 [ 117 S.Ct. at 825, 136 
L.Ed.2d at 780-81]. Furthermore, this impact must be more than 
merely incidental. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 [115 
S.Ct. 1624, 1630, 131 L.Ed.2d 626, 637-38] (1995). Stelzner, 621 
N.W.2d at 740-41. 
In order to show that the Commerce Clause is implicated in 
this case, the Parkers would need to show that the State's taxation 
of Kathy's entire income has a substantial effect on an identifiable 
interstate economic activity or market. They have failed to identify 
any interstate economic activity or market that is burdened by the 
taxation of Kathy's Nevada income. The Commerce Clause is not 
implicated in this case. 
Id, 148 Idaho at 847-48, 230 P.3d at739-40. 
Petitioner argues that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Comptroller of 
the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. 1787, 191 L.Ed. 2d 813 (2015), stands for the 
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proposition that a Idaho•s personal income tax scheme violates the dormant Commerce Clause 
because Mr. Dunn's entire income is affected and Mr. Dunn had no contact with the State of 
Idaho. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5. Moreover, Petitioner argues a violation because Mr. 
Dunn's income would be truced in a state where it was not earned. Petitioner also argues that 
case law provides that where non-residents are taxed on income earned in New Hampshire, but 
residents of New Hampshire are not taxed on income earned out of state violated the privileges 
and immunities clause because of the disparate treatment of residents and non-residents. 
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 6 (citing Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 95 S.Ct. 1191 
(1975)). Defendant argues that Parker is dispositive of the matter in the present case. 
Defendant's Reply Brief at 11. 
Petitioner's reliance on Wynne is misplaced. It is true that the Supreme Court held that 
Maryland's tax scheme violated the internal consistency test. Wynne, 135 S.Ct. at 1802-05, 191 
L.Ed. 813. However, the reason for the Court's decision was based on Maryland's disparate 
treatment of non-resident taxation as compared to the tax paid by residents. Id. The Court 
illustrated the disparity showing a non-resident would suffer double taxation under Maryland's 
taxation scheme while a resident's tax liability would be half that of the non-resident. Id. The 
Court concluded: 
[T]he donnant [c]ommerce [c]lause precludes states from 
discriminat[ing] between transactions on the basis of some 
interstate element. ... This means, among other things, that a 
[s]tate may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it 
crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the [s]tate ... 
. Nor may a [s]tate impose a tax [that] discriminates against 
interstate commerce either by providing a direct commercial 
advantage to local business, or by subjecting interstate commerce 
to the burden of multiple taxation. 
Jd. The same facts do not apply here. Petitioner's contention that Mr. Durm's entire income 
is affected is not persuasive. Defendant has assessed tax liability only to Petitioner's one~half 
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interest in wages earned in Texas and Washington. The analysis would be the same if the wages 
were earned entirely within the State of Idaho, or any other state. It cannot be said that Petitioner 
is subject to any internal inconsistency, nor is the tax liability disproportionately applied to non-
residents as compared to residents. Petitioner realized a one-half interest in the wages of Mr. 
Dunn pursuant to the community property laws of Texas and Washington and is subject to 
income tax on that interest in the State of Idaho. Further, Petitioner's interest is the only interest 
subject to Idaho tax liability. Defendant has not assessed a personal income tax on Mr. Dunn's 
interest in his earnings. Petitioner has failed to show a substantial effect on an identifiable 
interstate economic activity or market and Petitioner has not demonstrated how any economic 
activity or market is burdened by the taxation of Petitioner's interest in income earned in Texas 
and Washington. Further, there can be no violation of the privileges and immunities clause 
because Petitioner has not shown disparate treatment between non-resident and resident tax 
liability. Again, it is not the income attributable to Mr. Dunn that is being truced; Defendant is 
taxing mtly Petitioner's vested one-half interest in Mr. Dunn's wages. 
Therefore, the Court determines that Parker is dispositive of the current issue. The 
Commerce Clause is not implicated by Defendant's taxation of Petitioner's one-half interest in 
the wages earned by Mr. Dunn in Texas and Washington during the years in question. 
3. Attorney Fees and Costs. 
Idaho Code § 63-3049 reads in pertinent part: 
[ w ]henever it appears to the court that: ( 1) proceedings before it 
have been instituted or maintained by a party primarily for delay; 
or (2) a party's position in such proceeding is frivolous or 
groundless; or (3) a party unreasonably failed to pursue available 
administrative remedies; the court, in its discretion, may require 
the party which did not prevail to pay to the prevailing party costs, 
expenses and attorney's fees. 
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Idaho Code § 63-3049( d). Idaho Code § 12-117 provides for reasonable fees and costs if the 
court "finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Idaho 
Code§ 12-117. Further, Idaho Code§ 12-121 allows the trial judge to award reasonable fees 
and costs in a civil action at her discretion. Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
This Court does not determine that this review was initiated for purposes of delay, nor did 
Petitioner fail to pursue any administrative remedies. The only basis under Idaho Code § 63-
3049 that Respondent may receive fees and costs is if Petitioner's position was frivolous or 
groundless. 
A position is not frivolous merely because it ultimately fails. Edwards v. Donart, 116 
Idaho 687, 778 P.2d 809 (1989). "The sole question is whether the losing party's position is so 
plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation." Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 92,803 P.2d 993,998 (1991). 
The issue presented in the petition for review was not so plainly fallacious as to be 
determined frivolous or groundless. There is sparse case law dealing with the issue presented by 
Petitioner and the characterization of property as separate or community is generally controlled 
by the law of the state where property is acquired. The community property laws of Texas are 
similar in many ways to the laws of Idaho. However, there is a distinct difference in the manner 
of characterization of wages earned in Texas as compared to Idaho. This distinction, in large 
part, provided foundation for Petitioner's argument. It cannot be said that Petitioner's argument 
lacked foundation or was plainly fallacious. While Parker is on point with this Court's decision, 
in that case there was a stipulation as to what law applied, thus, the Parker Court did not address 
the precise issue addressed here. 
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The Court determines Petitioner's argument, while ultimately failing, was not devoid of 
merit. Therefore, Respondent's prayer for reasonable fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 
60-3049, 12-117, and 12-121 is denied. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Petitioner had a vested one-half interest in the wages earned by Mr. Dunn durL'1g tlie 
years in question. During that time Petitioner was domiciled in the State of Idaho. Petitioner is 
subject to personal income tax in her one-half interest in the wages earned by lvfr. Dunn during 
the relevant years in Washington and Texas. The Commerce Clause is not implicated in the 
present case because Petitioner has failed to show how Idaho's taxation scheme of Petitioner's 
entire income has a substantial effect on an identifiable interstate economic activity or market. 
Further, Petitioner cannot show that Idaho's taxing scheme fails the internal consistency analysis. 
Petitioner's argument was not frivolous, groundless, or otherwise lacking a reasonable basis in 
factor law. 
For these reasons, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the Commission's Final Decision and Order is AFFIRMED. 
DATED this }'rl'ay of June, 2016. 
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